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MANIPULATIVE GAMES OF GIFTS BY 
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES+
S. Burcu Avci,* Cindy A. Schipani** & H. Nejat 
Seyhun***
Executives appear to use a variety of manipulative games to maximize 
the value of their tax deductions for gifts of stock of their firms.  These 
games may include backdating the gifts, spring-loading or bullet-dodging 
release of information, and use of insider information.  We find a number 
of legal loopholes providing opportunities for executives to play these 
games.  We also find that stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the 
one-year period before the gift date and fall abnormally by about 5% 
during the one year after the gift date, supporting the likelihood these 
games are in play.  In addition, this pattern is stronger for gifts for which 
there is a reporting lag,  also consistent with illicit behaviors. We therefore 
suggest policy recommendations that should improve the compliance of 
gifts with the requirements of anti-fraud provisions of federal securities 
laws. 
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INTRODUCTION
Studies have shown that corporate insiders tend to make favorable 
charitable gifts just prior to a severe decline in the company’s share prices.1
The timing of these gifts is troubling; it suggests that the corporate insiders 
may have acted using material, non-public information to reap an unfair 
benefit.  Many of these donations were made at a time when it would have 
been illegal to make a sale of the same securities due to their access to this 
information. 
To explore whether these timing games may be played across the 
 1. See David Yermack, Deductio Ad Absurdum: CEOs Donating Their Own Stock to 
Their Own Family Foundations, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 107-08 (2009)(studying large gifts of 
stock by Chairmen and CEOs of public companies to their own private family foundations).  
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board generally and whether these manipulations continue to this day, we 
analyze the timing of gifts of common stock by corporate executives using 
a comprehensive dataset covering 1986-2014.  Specifically, we investigate 
five non-mutually-exclusive hypotheses for executives’ behavior regarding 
the timing of gifts in their own firms’ stock: 1) wait until after the stock has 
appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax 
deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the announcement of good news 
prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions 
(spring-loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of 
the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-
dodging); 4) backdate the gift date in order to maximize their donation and 
tax deductions (backdating); and 5) use material, undisclosed inside 
information about the future prospects of their own firms stock to 
maximize their donation and tax deductions (inside information). 
Unlike previous studies that use a very limited sample of firms or time 
periods, we investigate these hypotheses by utilizing a comprehensive 
database that includes all gifts of common stock where executives donate 
the stock of their own firms, in all publicly listed firms in the United States.  
Our dataset covers all reported gifts of common stock and contains over 
200,000 observations.  The total volume of gifts contained in our dataset is 
approximately 9.5 billion shares, with a dollar value of approximately $300 
billion.  Consequently, our findings are general and apply to all executives’ 
gifts of their firms’ stock.  Given the large dollar volume of gifts covered 
and the comprehensive nature of the study, our findings are important from 
legal, economic, and public policy perspectives. 
Overall, we find that gifts are well-timed over the time period of 1986-
2014.  Our research demonstrates that each of our five hypotheses explains 
at least some of the timing behavior of gift-giving of stock in the United 
States during this time period.  Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% 
during the one-year period before the gift date and they fall abnormally by 
about 5% during the one year after the gift date.  We find this pattern is 
stronger for late-reported gifts, which is consistent with the fraudulent 
backdating hypothesis.  We also find that almost two-thirds of gifts are 
reported late, taking advantage of an exception in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX),2 further contributing to the lax regulatory conditions that 
make it easy to manipulate the timing of gifts.  We suggest policy 
recommendations that should improve the compliance of gifts with the 
requirements of SOX as well as general anti-fraud provisions of federal 
securities laws. 
 2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(codified in sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).  
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Our finding that executives’ gifts are well-timed has economic and 
policy implications for the federal tax laws as well.  Under U.S. tax law, 
the donor of gifts of stock to public or private charitable foundations may 
obtain a personal income tax deduction for the market value of the shares 
while simultaneously avoiding the capital gains tax that would be due if the 
shares were sold.3  Furthermore, although open market sales of stock are 
undoubtedly within the purview of federal insider trading law, whether 
stock gifts to charity are so constrained is an unresolved question.4  These 
loopholes create an opportunity for exploitation: empirical evidence 
suggests that corporate insiders use their access to inside information to 
time their stock donations prior to price declines and thereby increase their 
federal income tax deductions.5
To address these issues, this paper proceeds as follows.  Section I 
offers, by way of background, a discussion of previous studies on 
executives’ gifts of common stock.  Section II analyzes the legal issues 
presented by timing gifts of stock.  Section III contains our empirical 
findings together with the legal implications of those findings.  In Section 
IV we offer proposals for reform followed by our concluding remarks.   
I. BACKGROUND – PREVIOUS STUDIES
Three types of motivation determine an individual’s desire to donate.6
The intrinsic motivation represents the subjective value of donating for its 
own sake, which is shaped by the individual’s altruism and other private 
preferences.7  The extrinsic motivation is related to external benefits gained 
from donations.8  Image (signaling) motivation links to the individual’s 
desire to be positively perceived by others, which affects both the 
individual’s reputation with others and her own self-esteem.9  Finance 
 3. Suppose that a stock purchased at $100 was gifted when the stock price reached 
$200 and subsequently, the stock price declined back to $50 after the gifting.  In this case, 
the individual can take a deduction for $200 instead of holding a share worth $50. 
 4. Yermack, supra note 1, at 107. 
 5. Id.
 6. See, e.g., Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 
AM. ECON. REV. 1652, 1652-53 (2006) [hereinafter Bénabou & Tirole, Prosocial Behavior]. 
 7. Dan Ariely et al., Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary 
Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 544, 544 (2009).
 8. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON.
STUD. 489, 492 (2003).  Extrinsic motivation is often described as a reinforcement 
mechanism or contingent reward in behavioral economics and human resources 
management literature. 
 9. Bénabou & Tirole, Prosocial Behavior, supra note 6, at 1653-54. See also Zachary 
Grossman, Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in Giving 1-2 (Nov. 4, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (describing how social signaling, actions taken to influence 
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literature basically seeks answers for the second motive. 
Studies on charitable gifting have focused on the income and price 
elasticities of donations.10  One of the earlier studies on this topic, 
conducted by Professors Martin Feldstein and Amy Taylor, explores 
income tax benefits of donations by analyzing special tax returns filed in 
1962 and 1970.11  The study concludes that tax deductibility of donations 
provides an efficient subsidy for charities.12  Alternative tax policies 
affecting the volume and distribution of gifts and distribution of tax 
liabilities, and net disposable income among donors and donees, are 
important determinants of donations as well as matters of public policy.13
others’ perceptions of oneself, and self-signaling, “efforts to maintain positive beliefs about 
oneself,” underscore image motivation in the context of giving).
 10. See, e.g., Auten et al., infra note 13, at 371 (using panel data to analyze elasticity of 
giving); Daniel Feenberg, Are Tax Price Models Really Identified: The Case of Charitable 
Giving, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 629, 629 (1987) (creating a microeconometric analysis of 
charitable contributions); Feinstein & Taylor, infra note 11, at 1201 (stating that charitable 
gifts are an important source of finance); Martin Feldstein & Charles Clotfelter, Tax
Incentives and Charitable Contributions in the United States: A Microeconometric Analysis,
J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (1976) (discussing the controversy of how tax rules influence charitable 
gifts); Randolph, infra note 13, at 1 (presenting evidence of price and income elasticity); 
Michael K. Taussig, Economic Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Contributions, 20 NAT’L TAX J. 1, 1 (1967) (emphasizing the importance of tax deductible 
gifts); Laura Tiehen, Tax Policy and Charitable Contributions of Money, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 
707, 707 (2001) (estimating price and income elasticities of charitable giving). 
 11. Martin Feldstein & Amy Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 44 
ECONOMETR CA 1201, 1201 (1976).  In the 1970s, the charitable tax break was generally 
equivalent to the fair market value of the donated item(s), just like today. Id. at 1203.  
However, the federal income tax marginal rates have varied significantly over the past half-
century, arguably affecting the prevalence of, and trends in, charitable giving.  See List, 
infra note 12, at 170 (discussing how marginal tax rate variations over the past 
administrations were accompanied by “changes in the charitable deduction caps” – a 
phenomenon in which “changes in tax deductibility represent another source of variation 
that can affect giving.”). 
 12. That is, charitable giving is “price elastic” – the marginal benefits of giving (the 
value of donations charities receive) exceed the marginal costs (lost tax revenue).  John A. 
List, The Market for Charitable Giving, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 157, 169-70 (2011). 
 13. Studies typically support the importance of tax policy on donor behavior.  Although 
they suggest other factors affecting donor behavior exist, studies have provided conflicting 
evidence about the relative significance of these factors.  For example, Professor William 
Randolph finds evidence that income elasticity is important, and because people have a 
tendency to smooth their consumption over time, the volume of donations is affected by 
transitory income elasticity as well as permanent price elasticity.  William C. Randolph, 
Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J.
POL. ECON. 709, 710 (1995).  On the other hand, Professor Gerald Auten and colleagues 
argue that transitory income and tax effects have no impact on gift-giving behavior – what 
matters are the persistent tax and income effects.  Since tax policies have long-lasting 
effects on company income level, they are the most important elements determining the 
amount and timing of donations.  Entities adjust donations more on based on tax regulation 
than on income shocks.  See Gerald E. Auten et al., Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: 
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Very few studies have looked specifically at CEOs’ stock gifts.  Four 
studies are relevant to note:  the first conducted by Yang Ho Kim and Man-
U Lee,14 the second by Woon-Oh Jung and Sung Ook Park,15 the third by 
David Yermack16 and the last by Sudip Ghosh and Maretno A. Harjoto.17
In the first paper, Professors Kim and Lee examine the transfers and 
subsequent cancellations of stock gifts in the period between 1993 and 
2002 by South Korean controlling shareholders attempting to minimize 
their gift tax.18  They discover that prior to 2000, executives donated stocks 
to their families on the days they estimated that the stock prices would be at 
local minimums.19  If stock prices continued to decline after the donation 
dates, executives cancelled the gifts.20  After a more restrictive gift-tax 
valuation rule for stock gifts was enacted in Korea in 2000, however, the 
incidence of this form of passive timing manipulation decreased 
significantly.21  Professors Jung and Park, in the second study, analyze 
stock gifts of controlling shareholders to their families in Korea for the 
2000-2004 period.  Their study finds that companies would depress their 
stock prices close to these transfer dates by disclosing negative news to or 
withholding positive news from the market, thereby reducing the donor’s 
gift taxes.22  In the third study, Professor Yermack considers 150 stock gifts 
made by public company Chairmen and CEOs to their family charities in 
the U.S.,23 and finds inflated stock prices around the days of gift.  Increased 
stock prices provide income tax shields, and an opportunity to offset capital 
An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371, 372 (2002) (discussing empirical data 
on charitable giving with special emphasis on the effects of taxes). 
 14. Yang Ho Kim & Man-U Lee, A Study on the Gift Time Management of Listed 
Stocks, 20 KOR. J. TAX’N RES. 57 (2003).  Because this article is published in Korean, we 
refer to Jung & Park, infra note 18, for a helpful description of its contents. 
 15. Woon-Oh Jung & Sung-Ook Park, Do Controlling Shareholders Manage the 
Timing of Information Disclosure When Making a Stock Gift?, 39 AS A-PAC. J. F N. STUD.
831 (2009). 
 16. Yermack, supra note 1.   
 17. Sudip Ghosh & Maretno A. Harjoto, Insiders’ Personal Stock Donations from the 
Lens of Stakeholder, Stewardship and Agency Theories, 20 BUS. ETH CS: A EUR. REV. 342 
(2011).
 18. Jung & Park, supra note 15, at 835. 
 19. Id. at 835-36. 
 20. Id. at 836. 
 21. Prior to 1997, the Korean valuation rule for gifts of stock was the closing market 
price on the gift date.  In 1997, this changed to the average of the daily closing prices over 
the three-month period prior to the gift date.  In 2000, the rule became the average market 
price in the two months before and two months after the gift date.  Id. at 834.  This is the 
rule in force as of 2014.  For more details on these rules, see MINISTRY OF STRATEGY & FIN.,
S. KOR., KOREAN TAXATION 163 (2014). 
 22. Jung & Park, supra note 15, at 858. 
 23. Yermack, supra note 1, at 108. 
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gains yields to donors in the U.S.  In the last study, Professors Ghosh and 
Harjoto find price movements in the U.S. market similar to those described 
in Professor Yermack’s study.  Executives time their donations to benefit 
from tax advantages. 
The motivations that affect stock prices around gift dates in Korea are 
different from those that affect such prices in the U.S.  Historically, most 
Korean companies were effectively managed by their controlling 
shareholders and their families,24 and aspects of the huge, multi-
conglomerate, family-controlled “chaebol” system still persist today.25
Controlling families maximize and propagate their personal wealth by 
donating shares to their children.26  However, the extremity of inheritance 
and gift taxes, which reaches a maximum at 50% in Korea, forces 
executives to look for astute ways to protect their level of wealth.27
Professors Kim and Lee document that before the Korean law began to use 
time periods after the gift date to calculate the gift tax on stock gifts, 
executives gave stocks to their families when they estimated the stock 
prices would not drop further.28  In line with this policy, they cancelled 
donations if stock prices continued to drop.29  This is a passive strategy: 
executives do not change the timing of information disclosures, nor do they 
attempt backdating in order to minimize stock prices around the date of 
donation; rather, they appear to use their insider information to find the 
most appropriate date.30
In 2000, Korean law changed the valuation base for assessing the gift 
tax on a stock gift to the average market value of the underlying stock over 
the four-month period encompassing the two months before and two 
months after the gift date.31  Under this law, Korean executives might keep 
stock prices low before and after gift dates.  To test this hypothesis, Jung 
 24. See Jung & Park, supra note 15, at 831 (“[I]nvestigat[ing] whether Korean 
controlling shareholders attempt to influence stock prices by managing the timing of 
information disclosures when they transfer stocks to related parties as gifts.”).  
 25. See Charlotte M. Powers, The Changing Role of Chaebol: Multi-Conglomerates in 
South Korea’s National Economy, 10 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 105, 105 (2010) (discussing 
how “chaebols” are often seen as antiquated, but actually remain at the heart of South 
Korea’s economic prosperity). 
 26. Jung & Park, supra note 15, at 832. 
 27. Id. (explaining how, in order to alleviate the “severe tax bites” from “cross-
generational stock transfers,” controlling shareholders are incentivized to “influence stock 
prices during the period in which they transfer stock to related parties by gift.”). 
 28. Id. at 835-36 (“[Kim and Lee] discover[ed] that in the period before 2000 the 
controlling shareholders of most firms chose gift dates to fall on the days when their stock 
prices were perceived to be the lowest . . . .”).   
 29. Id. at 836. 
 30. Id.
 31. Id. at 834. 
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and Park analyze timing of information disclosures when company 
executives made stock gifts.32  In accordance with the stock price valuation 
period, they analyze the prices of stock starting from two months prior to 
two months after the gift date.  During the valuation period for a gifted 
stock, its price would remain low, but after the valuation period ended, the 
price would go up again.33  This suggests that Korean executives 
consciously keep stock prices low during the valuation period of gifted 
stocks so that donations seem less valuable.  The study concludes that 
executives delay good news and bring bad news forward during the 
valuation period, and release good news only after the valuation period is 
over.34  To control for possible endogeneity resulting from up and down-
markets, they compare donating firms with non-donating peers, and 
conclude that their results are robust.35
In contrast, the American legal system provides incentives for U.S. 
executives to make donations of stock gifts.  First, U.S. executives are not 
generally affected by a gift tax in the case of charitable contributions, and 
the larger the value of their donation, the larger their tax benefit.36
Consequently, executives in the United States are interested in maximizing 
the value of their stock donations, not minimizing them.  Second, personal 
stock gifts in the U.S. are exempted from at least some insider-trading laws 
which would otherwise restrict their open market sales and purchases, 
enabling executives to make stock gifts (as opposed to open market sales) 
even during company blackout periods.37  Executives are also subject to 
more relaxed reporting requirements (Form 5 instead of Form 4) with 
respect to gifts, and the short-swing profit prohibitions of Section 16(b) do 
not apply to gifts. 
Stock gifts provide two additional types of benefits to managers.  
They provide income tax deductions, and they offset the personal capital 
gains tax owed if the shares were sold at a premium in lieu of donating 
them.  Thus, we should interpret the findings in U.S. studies in the light of 
these facts. 
Professor Yermack’s study considers 150 stock gifts made by public 
 32. Id. at 832. 
 33. Id. at 852. 
 34. Id. at 844-846 (discussing the study’s empirical results). 
 35. Id. at 851-57. 
 36. See 26 U.S.C. § 2522 (2015) (stating that charitable contributions are generally 
deducted from the base for computing gift tax). 
 37. Yermack, supra note 1 at 107-08.  See also Coles C. Bettis & M. Lemmon, 
Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 191, 199 (2000) 
(analyzing corporate policies to regulate stock trading by insiders and how blackout periods 
affect trading rates and profitability). 
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company chairmen and CEOs to their family charities.38  He found that the 
stock price creates a local maximum at the actual reported gift date, with 
the stock price rising and falling by an irregular 3% in the two-month 
period around that date.39  Yermack found a pattern of “excellent timing,” 
observing that CEOs tend to donate shares following run-ups in their 
companies’ stock prices.40  On average, the gift date coincided with a peak 
in the stock price trajectory, with prices falling in the months after the date 
of gift.41  Furthermore, this post-gift price drop was more dramatic for 
larger gifts than for smaller ones, regardless of the methodology used to 
calculate abnormal stock returns.42
Professor Yermack presents two possible explanations for the 
favorable timing of these stock gifts.  First, he suggests that this is the 
result of insider information, wherein corporate insiders time their 
donations of stock on the basis of material, non-public information in a 
manner that will increase their personal income tax deductions.43
Executives may thus wait to donate stock just prior to negative earnings 
announcements or just after positive ones.44  Second, he suggests that 
perhaps the executives are backdating the date of the stock donation to 
increase their tax deductions.  Ex-post, CEOs may increase the value of 
their tax deduction for charitable contributions by backdating the date of 
their stock gifts to local peaks in the company’s stock price trajectories.45
Stock gift backdating is likely to violate IRS regulations, which look to the 
date the stock gift is donated when assessing its value for tax purposes.46
Yermack found evidence consistent with both theories.  The data 
suggest CEOs are taking advance information about earnings releases into 
account when choosing the timing of stock gifts.47  He noted a pattern 
where some CEOs would make their donations just before negative 
earnings announcements, and others would delay them until just after 
positive announcements.48  Yermack also found evidence consistent with 
the backdating of stock gifts by CEOs to their family foundations for gifts 
 38. Yermack, supra note 1, at 108. 
 39. Id.
 40. Id.
 41. Id. at 114. 
 42. Id. at 114-15. 
 43. Id. at 118-19. 
 44. Id. at 119. 
 45. Id.
 46. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(b) (2015) (stating that “[o]rdinarily, a contribution is 
made at the time delivery is effected.”). 
 47. Yermack, supra note 1, at 108. 
 48. Id. (“Some CEOs made gifts of stock just before adverse quarterly earnings 
announcements, a time when company blackout periods would almost always prohibit open 
market sales.”). 
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made outside the month of December.49  The data showed a positive 
relationship between the favorable timing of CEO stock gifts to family 
foundations and the time lag between the purported gift date and the date 
the donor filed the donation with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which did not hold true for CEO’s gifts of stock to other donees.50
This finding is consistent with backdating, as it implies that non-December 
donations tend to be better timed when CEOs have a larger temporal range 
of dates on which to report the gift.  Yermack’s data also shows that for all 
stock gifts, favorable timing is positively associated with the size of the 
stock gift.51
Yermack drew a number of conclusions from these results.  First, 
many corporate executives opportunistically time their gifts on the basis of 
inside information or backdate their gifts to increase the value of their 
income tax benefits in the guise of charity.52  Second, less-than-charitable 
motives illuminate the popular use of private family foundations as 
recipients of charitable contributions.53  The majority of the family 
foundations in the sample fail to follow the prudent investor rule of 
investment management:  the trustees, which are usually comprised of the 
CEO and his family members, retain stock gifts instead of diversifying 
their assets.54  Yermack’s conclusion indicates that there is “a surprising 
mix of motives by corporate executives who make large charitable 
contributions: while seeking to subsidize good works in society, they 
simultaneously follow aggressive tax evasion strategies.”55
Professors Ghosh and Harjoto analyze the personal stock donations of 
top executives and board directors in the United States for the 1993-2005 
period.56  The study focuses on executives’ timing of stock gifts in relation 
 49. Id. at 121.  Many of the CEO’s stock gifts occurred in December, which is when 
most tax-motivated charitable donations are made.  Many taxpayers wait until the end of the 
taxable year to determine their charitable contributions once they have full knowledge of 
their annual taxable income. 
 50. Id. at 117-118. 
 51. Id. at 108. 
 52. Id.
 53. Id. at 109. 
 54. Id. The “Prudent Investor” rule, which grew out of the “Prudent Man” rule first 
articulated in Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446 (1830), requires that a trustee “manage 
a trust portfolio with ‘an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives 
reasonably suited to the trust’ and to ‘diversify the investments of the trust.’”  See also Max 
M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, The Prudent Investor Rule and Market Risk: An 
Empirical Analysis 1 Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 15-06, 2015, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583775 [https://perma.cc/ZCD2-
CJXL] (“Under the rule a trustee must minimize idiosyncratic risk, align market risk with 
beneficiary risk tolerance, and manage market risk exposure on an ongoing basis.”). 
 55. Yermack, supra note 1, at 122.  
 56. See Ghosh & Harjoto, supra note 17 at 347 (explaining that stock donations by 
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to the shareholder returns and corporate social responsibility of their 
companies.57  Ghosh and Harjoto separate stock price data into two groups: 
stocks of companies where insiders make stock donations and stocks of 
companies where insiders do not.58  They find evidence that corporate 
executives opportunistically time their gifts to obtain tax benefits.  The 
price patterns around stock gift announcement dates support Yermack’s 
inside information and backdating theories.59  They then analyze the 
relationship between insider stock donations and returns to shareholders.  
By comparing the “no insider donation” and “insider donation” data, they 
find evidence that short-term and long-term returns of donating companies 
are inferior to peers in which managers do not donate.60  This result shows 
that stock donations provide personal benefits to executives but reduces 
holdings of shareholders.  Thus, executives’ personal donations of 
company stock may be described as a principal-agent problem.61  Ghosh 
and Harjoto also find that top executives make fewer insider stock gifts in 
companies with stronger notions of corporate social responsibility.62  This 
indicates that the more socially responsible  the company, the less the 
shareholders are harmed by executives opportunistically extracting 
personal benefits from stock donations.  This behavior is consistent with 
stakeholder theory.63
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Federal Tax Laws 
The tax benefits stemming from the charitable donation of stock 
depend on the length of time the stock is held, whether the stock is closely 
or publicly held, and whether the recipient of the gift is a public or private 
insiders frequently work against shareholder wealth). 
 57. Id. at 343. 
 58. Id. at 347. 
 59. Id. at 348-49. 
 60. Id. at 349-50 (explaining that stock donations are triggered by self-interest and have 
a negative effect on both short- and long-term shareholder returns). 
 61. Principal-agent problems refer to situations where the agents act to maximize their 
own preferences and not those of the principal.  In general, agents do not make the same 
choices as would the principal.  In the current context, when executives donate stock, they 
look to maximize their personal benefit instead of that of their shareholders.  See id. at 346 
(applying agency theories to executives’ stock donations). 
 62. Id. at 351 (confirming that executives at companies with fewer indicators of 
corporate social responsibility are more likely to make stock donations). 
 63. Id. at 354 (“[Corporate social responsibility] as a measure of fulfilling stakeholder 
interest is associated with less likelihood and lower intensity of insiders’ stock donation, 
which is consistent with stakeholder theory.”). 
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entity.  Generally, for charitable contributions of stock, any excess not 
deductible in the year of contribution is carried forward for up to five 
subsequent tax years.64  The contribution of any stock held long-term – that 
is, for more than one year65 – permits the donor to deduct the fair market 
value of contributed stock.66  The contribution of any securities held short-
term – for one year or less – limits the deduction to the lower of the donor’s 
cost basis and the fair market value of the security.67
The contribution of long-term marketable stock to public charities 
permits the donor to deduct the fair market value of the donated stock in an 
amount up to 30% of the donor’s adjusted gross income (AGI), with a five-
year carry-forward; cost basis is not taken into account.68  In the case of 
short-term marketable stock contributed to public charities, the donor’s 
deduction is the lower of donor’s cost basis and the stocks’ fair market 
value, and is limited to 50% of the donor’s AGI.69  The fair market value of 
the contributed marketable stock is the mean between the high and low 
price on the date of the contribution.70
Taxpayers who contribute marketable stock to a private foundation 
receive more limited tax benefits.  Donors are subject to a maximum 
deduction of 20% of AGI for contributions to private foundations.71
Generally, for contributions of stock held long-term, the donor is still 
entitled to deduct the full fair market value of the donated shares; however, 
if the donor contributes stock valued at over 10% of all of the corporation’s 
outstanding shares, the deduction becomes the donor’s cost basis for the 
additional amount.72  For contributions of short-term stock, the donor’s cost 
basis deduction is limited to 30% of AGI. 
Contributions of closely held stock to public charities or donor-
advised funds are subject to the same deduction, AGI limitation, and carry-
forward rules as those for contributions of marketable securities.  For 
transfers of closely held stock to private foundations, donors are permitted 
only a deduction equal to the lower of their cost basis or fair market value, 
 64. 26 U.S.C. § 170(d)(1) (2012). 
 65. See 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3) (2012) (defining long term capital gain as “gain from the 
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year, if and to the extent such gain is 
taken into account in computing gross income.”). 
 66. Id. § § 170(a)(1), (e)(1), (e)(5). 
 67. Id. § 170(e)(1)(A). 
 68. Id. § 170(b)(1)(C). 
 69. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A). 
 70. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(b)(1) (2015). 
 71. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
 72. Generally, for contributions of stock held long-term, the donor is still entitled to 
deduct the full fair market value of the donated shares for up to 10% of the value of the 
corporation’s outstanding shares.  Id. § 170(e)(5). 
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subject to a cap of 30% of AGI with the five-year carry-forward.73
Furthermore, if the donor claims a value in excess of $5,000 for the 
donation of securities that are not publicly traded, the value of the donation 
must be established by an independent appraisal conforming to Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) Regulations.74  In a nutshell, the appraisal must be 
prepared by a qualified appraiser who has earned a designation from a 
recognized professional organization.75  The appraisal must include a 
description of the property transferred, the date of contribution, any terms 
or conditions put on the property transferred, information on the qualified 
appraiser, the basis for making the valuation, the appraiser’s signature, and 
the date of the appraisal.76  Further, the appraisal must be made within 60 
days prior to the date of gift.77  The donor must attach an appraisal 
summary (IRS Form 8283), signed by both donee and appraiser, to her tax 
return.78
The federal income tax law may also impose an “excess business 
holdings” tax on private foundations.79  This rule limits a private 
foundation’s ownership of voting stock in a particular corporation to 20%, 
less the percent of voting stock owned by “all disqualified persons.”80  This 
20% ceiling is increased to 35% if the voting control of the corporation is 
effectively held by unrelated third parties who are not disqualified 
persons.81  A private foundation that violates this rule will be subject to an 
initial tax equal to 10% of the excess holdings.82  If the foundation 
continues to have excess business holdings, it will be penalized with an 
additional 200% excise tax.83
 73. Id. § 170(b)(1)(C). 
 74. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(1)-(2) (2015). See also, id. at § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi) 
(defining “publicly traded securities”). 
 75. According to the IRS Regulations, a qualified appraiser is an individual who (a) 
“holds himself or herself out to the public as an appraiser or performs appraisals on a regular 
basis,” (b) pursuant to 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(F), “is qualified to make appraisals 
of the type of property being valued,” and (c) is not i) the donor, donee, or a party to the 
transaction in which the donor acquired the relevant property, ii) any employee or relative of 
any persons described in (c)(i), iii) any appraiser who performs the majority of her 
appraisals for a person described in (c)(i). 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(5).  However, a person 
cannot be a qualified appraiser if “the donor had knowledge of facts that would cause a 
reasonable person to expect the appraiser falsely to overstate the value of the donated 
property.”  Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i)-(ii). 
 76. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(4)(ii). 
 77. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A). 
 78. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i). 
 79. 26 U.S.C. § 4943 (2012). 
 80. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A). 
 81. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B). 
 82. Id. § 4943(a). 
 83. Id. § 4943(b). 
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The category of disqualified persons includes “any person . . . in a 
position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs” of the 
foundation, such as substantial contributors, officers, directors, trustees, 
and related parties.84  Thus, a high-level corporate executive, such as a 
CEO, who wishes to contribute her company’s stock to her own foundation 
may be subject to the excess business holdings tax.  The federal tax law 
provides very limited safe harbors: 1) a de minimis exception that allows 
the private foundation to hold up to 2% of the voting stock, regardless of 
the percent of voting stock held by disqualified persons,85 and 2) a five-year 
time frame for the foundation to reduce its excess business holdings if the 
foundation receives the stock by gift or bequest before imposing the tax.86
The corporate insider benefits from the gift in two ways.  First, the fair 
market value of a gift of stock held long-term is deductible from her 
taxable income, decreasing the overall tax paid.  The tax benefits are 
especially substantial for top-bracket taxpayers.  A donor who is a 
corporate executive is likely to be subject to the highest marginal tax 
bracket of the Alternative Minimum Tax, which is currently 28%;87 thus 
this donor would receive a federal tax benefit of 28% of the fair market 
value of the stock.88  Second, the donor is able to escape the capital gains 
tax on the difference between the fair market value of the stock and her 
cost basis, which is particularly advantageous if the stock has significantly 
appreciated in value. 
B. Analysis of Liability under Federal Securities Laws 
When the donor of securities is also a corporate insider, the question 
of liability for insider trading becomes important.89  This Part addresses the 
securities laws at issue with respect to potential liability for insider trading.  
This includes Sections 16(b) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (1934 Act or Exchange Act),90 as well as corresponding SEC Rule 
 84. Id. § 4943(f)(4)(A). 
 85. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(C). 
 86. Id. § 4943(c)(6). 
 87. 26 U.S.C. § 55 (2012).  An individual U.S. taxpayer must pay the lower of regular 
tax and the alternative minimum tax.  The AMT ostensibly limits the tax benefits available 
to “taxpayers with high economic income.”  Topic 556 – Alternative Minimum Tax,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc556.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q2XC-3DDR]. 
 88. The donor would potentially also benefit from any charitable deductions available 
in state income taxes. 
 89. See infra notes 90-132 and accompanying text. 
 90. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp). 
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10b-5.91  In addition, implications for the charity arising under SEC Rule 
144, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, are discussed. 
1. Short Swing Profits: Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act  
The short-swing profit prohibition of Section 16(b) of the  Exchange 
Act does not permit corporate insiders to retain a profit from acquiring a 
security and disposing of it at a higher price (or vice versa) within six 
months.92  Section 16(a) requires that corporate officers, directors, and 10 
percent shareholders publicly report all attainment and disposition of stock, 
which includes gifts.93  This implies that a charity with at least 10 percent 
ownership of a publicly traded company’s stock is also subject to Section 
16.94
SOX provides further details regarding time requirements for 
reporting.  According to SOX, all open market sales and purchases must be 
disclosed on Form 4 within two business days.95  SOX, however, did not 
update the reporting rules for bona fide gifts of stock, which are subject to 
less stringent requirements: gifts are reported on Form 5, which must be 
filed within 45 days after the end of the company’s fiscal year.96  Yermack 
finds that nearly half the executives in his sample delayed reporting their 
gift beyond two business days.97  Importantly, current law provides an 
exemption to insider trading liability for bona fide gifts.  In proposing an 
amendment to Rule 16b-5(a), which removed gifts from the scope of short-
swing profit liability, the SEC stated that it believed “[b]ona fide gifts 
represent less likelihood for opportunities for abuse.”98  This exemption 
originated in Truncale v. Blumberg, where the court stated: “[b]y no stretch 
of the imagination . . . can a gift to charity . . . when made in good faith and 
without pretense or subterfuge, be considered a sale or anything in the 
nature of a sale” within the meaning of Section 16(b).99
Furthermore, Section 16(b) requires that any insider’s “short-swing” 
profit (the difference between purchase and sale prices for any two 
 91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). 
 93. Id. at § 78p(a). 
 94. Id.
 95. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002). See also infra note 167 (discussing the required disclosure on Form 4). 
 96. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3. 
 97. Yermack, supra note 1, at 110. 
 98. Id. at 111 n.8 (quoting Ownership Reports on Trading by Officers, Directors, and 
Principal Stockholders, 53 Fed. Reg. 49,997 (Dec. 13, 1988)). 
 99. Id. (quoting Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F.Supp 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)). 
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transactions within any six-month period) be forfeited to the company.100
The short-swing profit rule bars corporate insiders from acquiring a 
security and then disposing of it at a higher price (or vice versa) within any 
interval shorter than six months.  But bona fide gifts to a charity are exempt 
from Section 16(b) matching.101
Any charity that owns more than 10% of a publicly traded company’s 
stock will be subject to Section 16.102  A donor who is required to report 
under Section 16 and who transfers shares to a charity, including a private 
foundation created by the donor and for which the donor serves as a 
director, must report the transfer in the annual filing of (the more lenient) 
Form 5, or voluntarily report earlier on Form 4.103  Ordinarily, assuming the 
shares cannot be used for the donor’s benefit, the donor will no longer have 
beneficial ownership in the stock once the charity owns the shares.  The 
charity will be the Section 16 reporting party as long as it owns at least 
10% of the shares and the donor will no longer have any Section 16 
reporting responsibility with respect to the transferred shares. 
2. Anti-Fraud Provisions: Section 10b and SEC Rule 10b-5 
Section 10b of the 1934 Act104 and corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5105
prohibit fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”106
Unlike Section 16(b), there is no exemption for anti-fraud liability.  Those 
who violate this prohibition must disgorge any profit, may be liable for 
damages, and may face criminal charges.107  A corporate insider making a 
charitable gift and realizing a tax benefit may be in violation of Rule 10b-5 
if the donation was made with knowledge of yet to be announced negative 
news that will drive the value of the stock down shortly after the grant.108
As Yermack points out, although a charity could sue a donor under Rule 
10b-5 if it relied upon the fair market value of the stock donated, such 
litigation would have a “chilling effect” on future donations.109
There is a question regarding whether an ostensibly charitable transfer 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). 
 101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-5 (2012). 
 102. Exchange Act Section 16 and Related Rules and Forms, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
(Aug. 11, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/sec16interp.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2Y46-YLRL]. 
 103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(a) (2015). 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2015). 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 107. Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960, 1007-1012 (1985). 
 108. Yermack, supra note 1, at 111.  
 109. Id. at 112 n.9. 
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should be considered a sale under Section 10(b) of the Act.  This question 
has not yet been considered by the courts.  The 1934 Act defines “sale” 
broadly: “[t]he terms ‘sale’ and ‘sell’ each include any contract to sell or 
otherwise dispose of [securities].”110  Therefore, the main question that 
arises is whether the gift is a “sale” or is “in connection with” a sale for the 
purposes of a violation of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5.  To determine 
whether a gift will be treated like a sale under the anti-fraud provision, case 
law establishes a three-prong test: 1) change of ownership; 2) donor 
receives consideration of pecuniary value; and 3) the treatment is 
“consistent with the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act.”111  Furthermore, 
there must be scienter, “meaning an intent to deceive, manipulate or 
defraud.”112
Generally, the gift is not a sale as there is no consideration for the 
donor for the transfer of the securities.113  Yet, the gift may be a disguise for 
a sale if the donor receives some type of economic benefit from the 
transfer.  Courts have construed the personal benefit requirement quite 
broadly, including elusive expectation of future economic gain, 
improvement of friendship, or reputation.114  It can be quite easily argued 
that the donor receives a personal benefit when making a gift, as there is a 
tax benefit.  A corporate insider who “controls or significantly influences” 
the organization to which the securities are being donated is more likely to 
be perceived by a court to have received a personal benefit.115
In addition, if the charity has knowledge of material inside 
information through the insider, it follows that it should be prohibited from 
transferring those shares until the information becomes public.  If the 
charity will immediately or shortly thereafter sell the securities, a gift may 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (2012). 
 111. Yermack, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Carol J. Sulcoski, Note, Looking a Gift of Stock 
in the Mouth: Donative Transfers and Rule 10b-5, 88 MICH. L. REV., 604, 615 (1989)).  
Generally, bona fide gifts of securities are not sales.  Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 
(2d Cir. 1949).  A gift of stock is a “sale,” however, “when the purpose of the ‘gift’ is to 
advance the donor’s economic objectives rather than to make a gift for simple reasons of 
generosity.”  Universalscience.com, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7879, 2000 WL 
1121540 (Aug. 8, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-7879.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8RQM-DBCV].  So, for example, where a “free” stock distribution 
benefits donors by attracting people to their website, the “gift” was deemed a “sale.”  Id.;
see also Lawrence v SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1968) (stating that there is no 
significant difference between the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act with 
respect to the definition of “sale.”).  Further, by using the word “include” rather than 
“means,” the term “sale” is defined broadly under the Securities Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C. § 
78c(14) (2012). 
 112. Id. (citing Sulcoski, supra note 111, at 623-24). 
 113. Tulli, supra note 89. 
 114. Id.
 115. Id.
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be an action “in connection with” a sale of securities, making the donor 
potentially liable.116  This establishes a similar tipper and tippee 
relationship to that discussed in Dirks v. SEC,117 where the Supreme Court 
stated that “[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself 
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”118  Therefore a corporate 
insider’s gift of securities that are then quickly sold seems to resemble 
tipping with a prompt trade and thus could be in violation of Rule 10b-5 for 
both parties.119
Although research has disclosed no court opinions specifically 
addressing when a charitable donation may constitute a “sale” within the 
context of insider trading, the SEC has brought a number of actions in 
federal court based on, at least in part, claims of illicit profits by insiders 
through charitable donations of stock.  For example, in SEC v. Zomax,120
the SEC successfully brought an insider-trading action against executives 
who sold stock through a charitable remainder annuity trust.  The SEC filed 
a civil injunction alleging that James T. Anderson, the former Chairman of 
the Board of Directors and CEO, and his wife, Michelle Bedard-Anderson, 
the former Executive Vice-President of Sales and Marketing of Zomax, 
violated securities laws when they liquidated their 821,250 shares of stock 
on the basis of material, non-public information that the company’s 
revenue and earnings would be considerably lower than expected in the 
third quarter of 2000.121  The two executives sold hundreds of thousands of 
shares in August 2000 on the open market, and later used the Jim and 
Mikki Anderson Charitable Reminder Annuity Trust (the Trust) to sell the 
rest.  By doing so, the two allegedly avoided $9 million in losses.  The 
Commission also claims that Anderson tipped his friend to sell shares of 
the company as well.122
The SEC argued that Zomax violated Section 10(b) and 13(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, and 13a-13 
when it filed a materially misstated Form 10-Q.123  In addition, it claimed 
Anderson and James Flaherty, Zomax’s previous CFO, violated Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when they made material misstatements or omissions 
and aided and abetted Zomax in violating Section 13(a) and Rules 12b-20 
 116. Id.
 117. 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). 
 118. . Id.
 119. Id.
 120. Zomax, Inc. et al., Exchange Act Release No. 19262, 2005 WL 1384084 (June 9, 
2005).
 121. Id.
 122. Id.
 123. Id.
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and 13a-13.124  It further alleged Anthony Angelini, Zomax’s former COO 
and President, also aided and abetted Zomax’s violations and that 
Anderson, his wife, friend, and the Trust violated Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 by 
trading the securities and tipping others.125  Anderson was also said to have 
violated Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act and rules promulgated 
thereunder when he failed to report the sales of the stock by the Trust. 
Zomax, Flaherty, and Angelini consented to the permanent injunction 
against them without admitting or denying the wrongdoing.126  Zomax 
agreed to pay $2 million dollars in civil penalties.127  Flaherty agreed to 
disgorge over $16,000 (plus prejudgment interest) and pay a $75,000 civil 
penalty, and Angelini agreed to disgorge over $43,000 and pay $50,000 in 
civil penalties.128  Litigation against all other parties continues. 
In another case, SEC v. Buntrock,129 the SEC alleged that “[t]hrough 
the gift of inflated stock, Buntrock was unjustly enriched in form of the 
increased tax benefit.”130  Buntrock, Waste Management’s CEO, gave a gift 
of 100,000 shares to his college alma mater 10 days before the new 
management stated that the previous year’s statements were inflated.131
The case was settled with entry of an injunction against future violations of 
the Exchange Act and disgorgement.132
3. Rule 144 
Rule 144 adopted pursuant to  the Securities Act of 1933 applies to:  
1) sales of unregistered stock (“restricted securities,” that is, shares that 
were not issued in registered public offerings) and 2) sales of stock by 
“affiliates” of a public corporation (“control securities”).133  Restricted 
securities are subject to information availability, a minimum holding 
period, and a variety of other requirements before they may be publicly 
 124. Id.
 125. Id.
 126. Id.
 127. Id.
 128. Id.
 129. Complaint – Demand for Jury Trial, SEC v. Buntrock, No. 02C 2180 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
26, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17435.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GJM3-V7FP]. 
 130. Id.
 131. Id.
 132. Buntrock, Litigation Release No. 19351 (Aug. 29, 2005), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19351.htm [https://perma.cc/T2GY-PYMX].  
 133. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (2015) (describing an “affiliate” of a stock-issuing 
corporation as “a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, 
controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer.”).  
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resold without registration.134  For shares in reporting companies, the 
required holding period is a minimum of six months after the shares have 
been paid for fully, and for shares in non-reporting companies, the 
minimum holding period is one year after full payment.135  Once the 
restricted securities are donated to a charitable organization, the 
organization is treated as having acquired the shares at the time they were 
acquired by the donor.136
Even when the stock earmarked for donation is already registered, if 
the donee organization is deemed to be an “affiliate” of the issuer 
corporation (due to, for example, significant ownership of the issuer 
corporation’s shares), Rule 144 requirements – other than the holding 
period requirement – may apply to any subsequent sales of the stock by the 
donee.137  It would not, however, apply to the gifting of the stock from the 
donor to the donee. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Empirical Results 
1. The Data 
We obtain stock price information from Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP).  The insider trading data come from the union of 
the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed (1986 to 2014) and 
backward extensions using archived annual purchases from the National 
Archives (1975 to 1995).  Our sample includes U.S. common stocks that 
are covered by all three databases.  The time period is from January 1986 
through December 2014.  Our final dataset has over 9,000 unique 
Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures numbers 
(CUSIPs) and over 200,000 observations. 
The Insider Filing Database includes all trades reported to the SEC - 
Ownership Reporting System.  The data contains all open market gifts by 
officers, directors, and beneficial owners (direct or indirect owners of more 
than 10% of any equity class of securities) of publicly traded firms.138  To 
 134. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. 
 135. Id. § 230.144(d). 
 136. Id. § 230.144; § 230.144(d)(3)(ii). 
 137. See Finale Rule – Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 33-8869 (Dec. 6, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8869.pdf [https://perma.cc/C63A-CSZR]. 
 138. For most of the sample period analyzed here (prior to August 29, 2002), Section 
16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act required that insider gifts be disclosed within the 
first 10 days of the month following the month of the trade.  SOX modified insider trading 
regulations in significant ways.  For example, the new reporting requirement states that 
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focus on executive gift-giving, we exclude all gifts by large shareholders.  
Gifts are designated by the transaction code “G”.  The final sample is 
limited to firms for which stock return data are available in CRSP.  In 
addition, to address potential misreports and incorrect outliers, we use 
cleansed data from Thomson-Reuters. 
Our gift database also provides two dates associated with an insider 
gift.  The transaction date is the date of the actual gift giving, when an 
insider donates the shares of their own company.  The report date is the 
date when an insider transaction is made public by the SEC.  Although our 
main emphasis is on the information content of insider gifts, we also 
consider the report dates to analyze potential timing games by insiders. 
2. Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 shows the sample characteristics of our dataset.  Our sample is 
large and covers a 29-year period, from 1986 to 2014, inclusive.  It 
includes all gifts of their firms’ shares by all executives in all publicly 
listed firms.  As shown in Table 1, the overall sample contains gifts by 
insiders in 9,676 unique firms from 1986 to 2014.  The total number of 
gifts equals 222,561.  Given the comprehensive nature of our dataset, our 
conclusions apply to all gifts by corporate executives and are not sample 
specific. 
insider transactions (including gifts) must be reported electronically by the end of the 
second business day following the day on which the transaction is executed both through 
EDGAR and corporate public websites.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L. 
107–204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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Table 1 also shows that the average gift size is about 43,000 shares.  
Gift size increases with the size of the firms.  In small firms, gift size 
equals about 35,000 shares, doubling to about 69,000 shares in large firms.  
The total number of shares gifted is also large, equaling about 9.5 billion 
shares: about 5.6 billion shares were gifted by top executives and the 
remaining 3.9 billion shares by officers and directors.  The average number 
of shares gifted per firm is about one million shares.  Insiders in large firms 
appear to gift a lot more shares than insiders in small firms.  The average 
number of shares gifted by insiders in small firms equals about half a 
million shares.  This number rises about 15-fold to 7.4 million shares gifted 
by insiders in large firms. 
The average stock price of the gifted shares is about $30 during the 
sample period.  Consequently, the dollar magnitude of the total gifted 
shares in our sample is about $300 billion per year.  This large amount 
makes the regulations about executive gift-giving important from legal, 
economic, and policy perspectives. 
3. Measurement of Abnormal Returns 
To explore whether insiders time their gifts, we compute abnormal 
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returns139 by subtracting the return to the equally weighted index of New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and 
the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) stocks from the returns for the stocks gifted by insiders.140
This approach controls for market movements and implicitly assumes that 
average beta or risk-exposure is one.  Given that our sample contains over 
9,000 firms, this assumption is satisfied.  Hence, abnormal return ARi,t for 
stock “i” and day “t” is computed as: 
                           for each firm “i” and day “t”, 
Where  is the simple daily return on the stock “i” gifted by insiders 
on day “t”,  is the daily return to the equally weighted index of NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on day “t”.  For each event date t, these 
returns are first averaged across all gifting firms “i” to compute average 
abnormal returns: 
The average abnormal returns are then cumulated across the event 
dates as follows: 
These cumulative abnormal returns are then graphed to examine the 
behavior of abnormal returns around gifting dates.141
 139. The term “abnormal returns” refers to the movements on stock price that cannot be 
attributed to market movements.  They are abnormal in the sense that there are not explained 
by normal market relation.  See, e.g., Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: 
Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting From the Interpretation of the Private Securities 
Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 793 (2000) (defining abnormal 
returns).
 140. Although not reported here, using as the benchmark the total return to the S&P 500 
index or to the value-weighted market portfolio instead of the total return to the equally 
weighted market portfolio gives similar results.  We prefer the equally weighted returns 
because most of the firms in our sample are small firms and the equally weighted index of 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms is a better match for small firms. 
 141. For a discussion of event studies and calculation of cumulative abnormal returns, 
see Brad M. Barber & John D. Lyon, Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns: The 
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4. Empirical Findings 
At this point, it is useful to summarize our five hypotheses regarding 
executives’ motivations for gifting  their own company stock: 1) wait until 
after the stock price has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as 
well as their tax deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the good news 
prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions 
(spring-loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of 
the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-
dodging); 4) backdate the gift date in order to maximize their donation and 
tax deductions (backdating); and 5) use material and undisclosed inside 
information about the future prospects of their firm’s stock to maximize 
their donation and tax deductions (inside information). 
Next, we examine the evidence to determine which of these five 
hypotheses best explain insiders’ behavior.  Figure 1 shows the pattern of 
abnormal returns for the overall sample period.  To get a clear picture about 
timing games, we provide abnormal stock price behavior before from one 
year before (250 trading days) to one year after the gifting date.  Figure 1 
further confirms the timing games.  Stock prices rise about 5.5% 
abnormally relative to the market index during the one-year before 
executives gift their stock.  Hence, if the overall market was up, the gifted 
stocks rose 5.5% more than the market.  If the overall market was down, 
the gifted stocks fell 5.5% less than the market during this period.  
Following the gifting date, stock prices fall abnormally by about 5% 
relative to the overall stock market.  The absolute maximum stock price 
occurs on the precise day of the gift. 
Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 341 (1997); S.P. 
Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring Long-Horizon Security Price Performance, 43 J.
FIN. ECON. 301 (1997); John D. Lyon, Brad M. Barber & Chich-Ling Tsai, Improved 
Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns, 54 J. FIN. 165 (1999); Mark J. 
Mitchell & Erik Stafford, Managerial Decisions and Long-Term Stock Price Performance,
73 J. BUS. 287 (2000). 
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Figure 1:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift 
dates.  Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted 
model.  Day 0 refers to the gift day.  Day 10 refers to the 10th trading 
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day 
before the gift date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, 
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice 
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees. 
The conclusion from Figure 1 is that executives are able to avoid a 5% 
decline in the value of their gifts by acting when they did rather than 
accelerating or delaying another year.  Hence, by carefully timing their 
gifts, executives are able to increase the size of their gifts, and their 
corresponding tax deduction by 5%.   
This evidence is consistent with all five hypotheses.  That stock prices 
rise abnormally prior to the gifting date is consistent with both the passive-
timing and spring-loading hypotheses.  That the stock prices drop 
abnormally after the gifting date is consistent with the bullet-dodging, 
backdating and inside information hypotheses.  To further distinguish 
among our five different hypotheses and to see if any of them could be 
rejected, we conducted the additional tests described below. 
In Figure 2, we group our sample by the role of the executives into 
two separate groups: 1) top executives, including the CEO, CFO, and 
Chairperson of the Board of Directors and 2) all other executives including 
officers and directors.  All shareholders without executive titles are 
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excluded.  Figure 2 shows a similar picture for both officers and top 
executives.  Stock prices run up more prior to top executives’ gifting dates 
and they decline less after the top executives’ gifting dates.  Hence, this 
evidence tells us that all insiders, regardless of title, use similar devices to 
time their gifts. 
Figure 2:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift 
dates.  Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted 
model.  Day 0 refers to the gift day.  Day 10 refers to the 10th trading 
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day 
before the gift date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, 
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice 
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.  
Top executives are defined as CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, 
and Chairman of the Board. 
In Figure 3, we group our sample by decades to explore the time-
series properties of executive gift-giving decade by decade.  During the 
first decade of our sample, 1986-1994, executives appear to gift stocks 
when the stock price was declining by about 7% prior to the gift date.  
After the gift date, stock prices continue their decline and fall another 17%.  
This evidence of the decade of 1986-1994 is inconsistent with the natural 
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timing and spring-loading hypotheses, but consistent with the other three. 
Figure 3:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift 
dates.  Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted 
model.  Day 0 refers to the gift day.  Day 10 refers to the 10th trading 
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day 
before the gift date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, 
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice 
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees. 
During the second decade (1995-2004), stock prices rise abnormally 
by about 6% during the one-year before the gift date.  Gifting takes place at 
the maximum relative stock price.  Furthermore, the stock prices fall 
abnormally by about 6% during the one-year after the gifting date.  This 
decade appears to be characterized by a classic pump-and-dump pattern.142
 142. This evidence suggests that executives donate stocks that are experiencing extreme 
declines in price as the stock price falls abnormally by about 30% over the two years.  The 
perpetrator of a classic pump and dump scheme “pumps” the price of a stock by misleading 
the public about the future profits or health of the company; after the market has absorbed 
this misleading information and it is reflected in the stock price, the perpetrator “dumps” her 
position and realizes a gain.  Meanwhile, the price often reverts to what it was before the 
misleading information was injected into the market.  David B. Kramer, The Way It Is and 
the Way It Should Be: Liability Under §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 
Thereunder for Making False and Misleading Statements as Part of a Scheme to “Pump and 
Dump” a Stock, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (2005). 
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This evidence is again consistent with all five hypotheses. 
During the most recent decade (2005-2014), stock prices rise by about 
9% prior to the gifting date and they fall about 1% after the gifting date.  
The gifting still takes place near the maximum prices, at least in the short-
run.  This picture suggests that recent scandals and publicity about 
backdating may have played a role in influencing executives to scale back 
in some of the timing games they play around the gifting of their stock.  
This evidence is most consistent with the natural timing and spring-loading 
hypotheses. 
Next we explore the relation between the size of the gifts and potential 
timing games.  This evidence is shown in Figure 4, which indicates a strong 
relation between the number of shares gifted and the price patterns.  Large 
gifts (greater number of shares gifted) appear to be associated with larger 
stock price increases before the gift date, while smaller gifts are associated 
with bigger stock price declines after the gift date.  Stock prices rise the 
most (by about 10% abnormally) for the largest category of more than 
100,000-shares gifted (approximately more than $3 million).  The increase 
in stock prices is smaller for the fewer-share groups.  For the smallest share 
groups, stock prices rise abnormally by about 5%. 
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Figure 4:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift 
dates.  Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted 
model.  Day 0 refers to the gift day.  Day 10 refers to the 10th trading 
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day 
before the gift date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, 
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice 
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees. 
The post-gift-date stock price behavior also depends on the size of the 
gift.  For the largest size category, stock prices do not decline at all.  For 
the smallest share-categories, stock prices decline between 4% and 7% 
during the year after the giving date. 
The evidence shown in Figure 4 indicates that the motivation behind 
gift-giving may be different depending on the amount of the gift.  For small 
and mid-sized gifts (up to about $3 million or less), executives not only 
receive a larger deduction as a result of the gift, but they also avoid the 
subsequent stock price decline.  This evidence is consistent with all five 
hypotheses. 
For very large gifts (more than $3 million), there is no subsequent 
stock price decline.  In this case, the gifting individuals are simply able to 
take a larger deduction by giving recently appreciated stock.  This evidence 
is most consistent with natural timing and spring-loading hypotheses. 
To explore the backdating hypothesis in more detail, we group our 
sample by reporting delays as shown in Figure 5.  Because reporting 
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requirements for gifts changed in September 2002 due to SOX, we restrict 
our attention in Figure 5 to gifts reported after September 1, 2002.143  In the 
post-SOX period, our sample contains 83,909 gifts with valid transaction 
and reporting dates. 
Figure 5:  Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift 
dates.  Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted 
model.  Day 0 refers to the gift day.  Day 10 refers to the 10th trading 
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day 
before the gift date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, 
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice 
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.  
Reporting delays (lags) are computed from the gift date to the SEC 
receipt date.  Time period is restricted to post September 1, 2002 
period.
Our backdating hypothesis suggests that if executives engage in fraud 
and backdate their gifts, then these gifts will necessarily appear to be 
reported with delays, even if in reality they are reported promptly.  
 143. Before the enactment of SOX in 2002, corporate insiders had between 10 days and 
40 days to report their gifts to the SEC (they could report by the 10th day of the following 
month in which the gift took place).   
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Furthermore, the greater the reporting delay, the greater the degree of 
fraud.
To explain this further, an example may be useful.  Suppose that 
executives decide to gift their stock on March 2, when the stock price is 
$50.  Also suppose that the stock price started at about $50 last April and 
had risen to a peak of $100 on January 2 before declining back to $50 at the 
time of gifting in March.  In order to maximize their donation, suppose that 
executives report January 2 as the date of their donation and take a tax 
deduction for the trading price on that date, when the stock price was $100.  
Executives then immediately report their donation in March on Form 4 to 
the SEC without any further delays. 
At this point, anyone examining Form 4 who is unaware of the fraud 
committed by the executive will deduce the following: 1) executives 
donated $100 worth of stock on January 2 and 2) executives reported this 
donation on March 2 with a two month delay.  Consequently, all that can 
be inferred is a late-reported gift.  Furthermore, given that gifts are allowed 
to be reported late in general, these delayed filings should not raise any 
suspicion.
To the extent executives go back into stock price history and backdate 
their donations, these gifts will be necessarily associated with reporting 
delays.  Furthermore, to the extent executives go further back into stock 
price history to find even higher stock prices in the past, those with greater 
delays will have a bigger peaks and bigger declines (ex-post).  Thus, the 
greater the reporting delays, the greater degree of fraud. 
Our evidence is consistent with backdating.  First, although not shown 
in the figure, many gift transactions are reported with significant delay, 
taking advantage of an exemption created by SOX, which allows 
executives to report gift transactions on Form 5 (instead of Form 4) up to 
45 days after the end of the fiscal year.  In our sample, of the total of 
83,909 observations post-September 1, 2002 where gifting and reporting 
dates are both available, 53,379 observations involve delayed reporting.  
This corresponds to almost two-thirds of the entire sample.  Although legal 
under SOX, this high proportion of delayed reporting certainly raises a red 
flag.
Second, the evidence in Figure 5 indicates a relation between 
reporting time lags and the inverse-V-shaped stock price patterns.  In the 
promptly reported group (33,487 observations), stock prices rise about 7% 
prior to the gift date and they decline 1% to 1.5% during the one-year after 
gifting.  For those gifts with short reporting delays of 3 to 20 days (19,892 
observations), stock prices rise about 6.5% prior to the gift date and they 
decline between 0.5% and 1% during the one-year after gifting.  Finally, 
for those gifts with long reporting delays of more than 20 days (30,520 
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observations), stock prices rise about 6% prior to the gift date and they 
decline between 2% to 2.5% during the one-year after gifting.144
That those gifts with the greatest reporting delays show the greatest 
stock price declines after the gift date is consistent with the backdating 
hypothesis.  Furthermore, that there are over 30,000 observations during 
the past 12 years in this category indicates that backdating could still be a 
problem with the timing of gifts.  Overall, our evidence suggests that 
executives are likely exploiting the delayed reporting provision available 
under SOX to backdate their gifts.  This finding indicates that immediate 
policy intervention is necessary to bring executive stock donations into 
compliance with anti-fraud statutes. 
As an additional test of backdating, we also classify the gifts by the 
abnormal stock returns around the gift date.  Since backdating involves 
picking a date with the highest stock price, we group gifts into two 
categories, one showing an abnormal stock price decline 30-days before the 
grant date, and the other showing an abnormal stock price increase during 
the 30 days before the grant date.  The backdating hypothesis predicts that 
the group with a stock price increase should show a greater stock price 
decline subsequently. 
The evidence is shown in Figure 6.  Consistent with the backdating 
hypothesis, the group with a prior 30-day stock increase shows about a 
7.7% drop during the next 250 days.  In contrast, the group with a prior 30-
day stock price decline before the grant date shows only a 6.2% drop 
during the next 250 days.  Once again, this evidence corroborates the 
conclusion that at least some gifts grants are still likely backdated. 
 144. The overall sample period shows stronger evidence of backdating.  For the overall 
period, the promptly reported gifts show a 2% subsequent decline.  For gifts reported 
between 3 and 20 days, the decline is 4.6%.  For late reported gifts with more than 20 days 
of delay, the decline is 5.1%. 
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Figure 6: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift 
dates.  Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted 
model.  Day 0 refers to the gift day.  Day 10 refers to the 10th trading 
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day 
before the gift date.  Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, 
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice 
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.  
Reporting delays are computed from the gift date to the SEC receipt 
date.  If the 30 day cumulative abnormal return from day -30 to day 
-1 is positive, then prior return is classified as “Up.”  If the 30-day 
cumulative abnormal return from day -30 to day -1 is negative, then 
prior return is classified as “Down.”  Time period is restricted to 
post September 1, 2002 period. 
B. Legal Implications of the Study 
As described above, our study demonstrates that all five of our 
hypotheses may be in play in various ways.  That is, the results can be 
explained by executives whom have 1) waited until after the stock has 
appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax 
deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerated the good news prior to the gifts 
to further increase their donation and tax deductions (spring-loading); 3) 
delayed the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock to again 
increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging); 4) 
backdated the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax 
deductions (backdating); and 5) used material and undisclosed inside 
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information about the future prospects of their firm’s stock to maximize 
their donation and tax deductions (inside information).  The legal 
implications of these hypotheses are analyzed below. 
1. Waiting for Natural Appreciation of Stock Value 
The first behavior that may explain some executive gift timing, 
waiting until the stock appreciates naturally then making a donation, does 
not raise any of the tax or securities law issues described in Part IIB above.  
Although this pattern provides a way for the owner of securities to avoid 
paying capital gains on the appreciation, this is no different than donating 
other property that has appreciated in value.  This would be a legally 
appropriate way for an insider to donate stock to a charity. 
Under federal tax law, charitable contributions receive significant 
preferred treatment.  The charitable deduction, which is available to 
corporations and individuals who choose to itemize their deductions, has 
continued to be one of the largest federal tax expenditures in terms of 
estimated revenue cost.145  This tax subsidy ostensibly motivates donors to 
provide financial support for a variety of organizations that the U.S. Tax 
Code has designated as charities.146  The tax preference is greater for 
higher-income individuals because the amount of the charitable deduction 
is a function of the donor’s marginal tax bracket.147
Donating appreciated property, such as stock that has increased in 
value, provides further tax advantages by allowing the donor to avoid 
paying capital gains tax on the appreciation.148  Furthermore, charitable 
contributions of appreciated property are treated differently from other 
transfers of appreciated property because the allowable deduction is equal 
to the fair market value of the entire property, rather than the difference 
between fair market value and basis – that is, cost basis is disregarded for 
purposes of the charitable deduction.149
Although recent studies have shown that the tax deduction for 
charitable giving may be an inefficient tax subsidy,150 there is no debate 
about its legality.  Maximizing one’s charitable deduction by waiting for 
the value of stock to appreciate before donating it is comparable to 
maximizing one’s stock option compensation by waiting for the underlying 
 145. Joseph J. Cordes, Re-Thinking the Deduction for Charitable Contributions: 
Evaluating the Effects of Deficit-Reduction Proposals, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 1001, 1001 (2011). 
 146. Id. at 1002. 
 147. Id.
 148. Id.
 149. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012). 
 150. See Cordes, supra note 145 (discussing various criticisms of the tax subsidy for 
charitable contributions). 
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stock to appreciate before exercising the option.  In both scenarios, the 
owner of the relevant securities does not take any steps to mislead the 
public, nor does she use any material inside information to increase her 
personal wealth.  Waiting for stock to appreciate naturally before donating 
it to charity is consistent with the 1933 and 1934 Acts’ “philosoph[ies] of 
full disclosure.”151
2. Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging 
The second and third hypotheses of executive behavior, accelerating 
good news prior to the gifts, or spring-loading, and delaying the release of 
bad news, or bullet-dodging, raise securities law concerns.  These 
behaviors have not been without controversy when occurring in the context 
of dating games played to maximize executive compensation through stock 
options.152  In the options context, spring-loading refers to the practice of 
either manipulating the date of the options grant so that it occurs just before 
information is released or delaying the release of positive information to a 
date just after the option is granted.  In either case, the executive’s stock 
options become immediately more valuable after the release of good news.  
This is analogous to spring-loading the donation of securities, in that the 
executive is manipulating information to the market in order to make the 
gift of stock provide greater personal benefit – in this case, a higher tax 
deduction – although the practice involves acceleration of the release of 
positive information rather than delay. 
Bullet-dodging, in the context of the grant of executive stock options, 
refers to the practice of accelerating the release of bad news to just before 
the grant of options, or manipulating the grant date of the option so that the 
option is granted just after the release of bad news.  Our data shows 
analogous behavior with respect to the executives’ gifting of securities, 
except that rather than accelerate the release of bad news, the news is 
delayed until after the gift, yielding a higher tax deduction than the 
executive would be afforded had the news been released prior to the gift. 
It would seem against the legislative intent of the federal securities 
laws to allow executives to manipulate information flow to shareholders 
solely for personal benefit.  Indeed, one of the major purposes of the 1934 
Act was the hope of Congress to curb an “unscrupulous insider . . . [from 
using] inside information for his own advantage.”153  Increased 
 151. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 187 (1963). 
 152. See Matthew E. Orso, Comment, “Spring-Loading” Executive Stock Options: An 
Abuse in Need of a Federal Remedy, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629 (2009) (examining remedies 
the government could use to regulate the practice of spring-loading). 
 153. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13 (1934). 
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transparency was a key motivator of the 1934 Act: “devices designed to 
create a misleading appearance of activity with a view to enticing the 
unwary into the market on the hope of quick gains” were explicitly 
frowned upon,154 and Congress called on “the corporate managers of 
companies whose securities are publicly held of their responsibilities as 
trustees for their corporations”155 to spur a renewal of investor confidence.  
Executives who engage in spring-loading and bullet-dodging practices – 
whether in the context of executive stock options or charitable 
contributions of stock – harm investor confidence by deliberately 
misrepresenting the value of their stock.  Decreased investor confidence 
may also lead to stock values plummeting; therefore, stockholders may 
have a viable argument that executives’ manipulation of information flow 
to increase their own tax deductions runs contrary to executives’ fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.156
Assuming that charitable contributions of stock could be viewed as 
disguised sales, bullet-dodging and spring-loading contributions should 
violate Rule 10b-5’s anti-fraud provisions.  Bullet-dodging – the practice of 
withholding negative information until after the gift is made – is 
particularly egregious because it involves actively concealing material 
information from the public.  It also artificially inflates the value of the 
donation at the time it is made; the later release of the negative information 
reduces the value of the stock in the hands of the charity, while the donor is 
still permitted a high tax deduction for the contribution. 
In addition, particularly with respect to bullet-dodging, the practice 
also seems to run afoul of the rules of disclosing or abstaining from trading 
as articulated by the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.157  In that case, 
where stock options were at issue, the court found that the recipients were 
required to disclose the positive information before accepting stock 
options.158  It follows that executives should not be permitted to gift shares 
of stock until the negative information in their possession has been 
disclosed.
3. Backdating 
Falsifying the date that a gift of securities was granted in order to reap 
higher tax deductions is fraudulent behavior under the federal tax laws.  
 154. Id. at 10. 
 155. Id. at 13. 
 156. See id. (noting that one primary purpose of the bill is to “encourage the voluntary 
maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in control” of registered companies). 
 157. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 158. Id. at 848. 
2016] MANIPULATIVE GAMES OF GIFTS 1167 
The IRS rules analyze the stock gift’s value on the actual transfer date.159
Backdating, in the charitable stock-gift context, occurs when the transfer 
date of the stock gift is changed ex-post to artificially increase the amount 
of appreciation and, in turn, the amount of the associated tax deduction. 
Backdating of executive option grants was discovered simultaneously 
by Professors Lie, Heron, Narayanan, and Seyhun, and reported in the 
financial press as early as February 2005.160  Researchers showed that 
managers falsified grant dates to receive options with lower strike prices.161
 159. . See I.R.S. Publication 561 (Rev. 1) at 2 (Apr. 2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p561.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHD7-FM83] (“If you deliver the certificate to a bank or 
broker acting as your agent or to the issuing corporation or its agent . . . the date of the 
contribution is the date the stock is transferred on the books of the corporation.”). 
 160. . See Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price 
Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 271 (2007) 
[hereinafter Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain] (finding significantly less abnormal 
stock returns after SOX passed, and that “in those cases in which grants are reported within 
one day of the grant date, the pattern has completely vanished, but it continues to exist for 
grants reporting with longer lags, and its magnitude tends to increase with the reporting 
delay.”); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 803 
(2005) (proposing that stock return patterns are due to awards being timed ex post facto so 
that the grant date is set in the past); M.P. Narayanan & Nejat Seyhun, The Dating Game: 
Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase Their Compensation?, 21 REV.
FIN. STUD. 975, 1943 (2008) (presenting evidence of selecting an advantageous grant date 
on a ex-post basis); M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Managers Influence Their 
Pay? Evidence from Stock Price Reversals Around Executive Option Grants 31 (Ross Sch. 
of Bus., Working Paper No. 927, 2005), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649804 [https://perma.cc/3GNS-DAXF] 
(finding that executive options are backdated); M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Effect 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Influencing of Executive Compensation 23-24 (Nov. 2005), 
(unpublished manuscript),   http://ssrn.com/abstract=852964 [https://perma.cc/VKS8-
DEGQ] (again finding that options are backdated and that SOX mandatory grant date 
reporting decreases, but does not eliminate opportunism).  See also Jesse M. Fried, Option 
Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 856-57 (2008) (stating that 
“thousands of firms continued to secretly backdate options by weeks or months after SOX, 
even though it entailed—in addition to other legal violations—a blatant disregard of the 
Act’s two-day reporting requirement.”); Ritter, infra note 161, at 133 (explaining why a 
company might backdate grants); Mark Hulbert, Test of Good Corporate Citizenship,
MARKET WATCH (Feb. 18 2005), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/timing-of-managers-
option-grants-a-good-litmus-test [https://perma.cc/85P8-5DLD] (“It appears as though many 
of them actually are back-dating the effective date of their option grants.”).
 161. . Jay Ritter writes: “On January 19, 2000, when computer manufacturer Apple’s 
stock closed at $106.56 per share, Apple announced that one week previously it had granted 
options to buy 10 million shares to CEO Steve Jobs with an exercise price of the January 12 
closing market price of $87.19.  The January 12th close was the lowest closing price of the 
two months prior to January 19.  Seven years later, Apple admitted that the dates of many 
options grants had been chosen retroactively, and that documents purporting to show that 
the board of directors had approved the grants on the dates chosen had in some cases been 
fabricated.  Wealth transfers from option backdating can be large.  For the January 2000 
grant alone, if there was a 70 percent chance that the options would eventually be exercised, 
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The stock price of the company would decline just before the exercise of 
the grant and increase thereafter.162  Research conducted in more recent 
years further suggests that managers are likely to make accounting 
adjustments favorable to the CEO before option grant dates.163
Options backdating is a practice whereby the date of the option grant 
is changed to a date prior to when the option was in fact granted.  This 
practice was even easier to execute when the SEC rules did not require 
reporting of the issuance of stock option grants until after the end of the 
fiscal year.164  This reporting delay allowed companies to wait until the 
exercise price dropped relative to that day’s market price.165  The option 
would then be backdated at its lowest point or near that point, so that this 
lower exercise price could then be reported to the SEC.166  Backdating of 
stock options thus allows the person who owns the stock options to realize 
larger potential gains without requiring the company to show these gains as 
compensation on the financial statement.167
Shortly after SOX was signed into law, the SEC changed its rule to  
require option grants to be disclosed within two days of the  grant.168  In 
the difference between the January 12th and 19th dates for the exercise price was worth 
almost $140 million to Jobs due to the difference between the $87.19 and $106.56 exercise 
prices.”  Jay R. Ritter, Forensic Finance, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 127, 131-32 (2008). See also
Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 160, at 294 (attributing abnormal stock 
price patterns to backdating); Randall Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option 
Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 513, 524 
(2009) (“We estimate that 13.6% of grants between 1996 and 2005 have been backdated or 
manipulated in some fashion.”); Robert M. Daines et al., Right on Schedule: CEO Option 
Grants and Opportunism 2 (Mar. 31, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (explaining that 
abnormal changes suggest various methods of managerial opportunism). 
 162. This is illustrated by a V-shape on a graph. 
 163. See, e.g., Terry A. Baker et al., Incentives and Opportunities to Manage Earnings 
around Option Grants, 26 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 649, 667-69 (2009) (explaining multiple 
factors that affect managers’ incentives); Mary L. McAnally et al., Executive Stock Options, 
Missed Earnings Targets, and Earnings Management, 83 ACCT. REV. 185, 212-13 (2008) 
(summarizing information about managers’ and CEOs’ incentives regarding earnings 
targets).
 164. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony 
Concerning Options Backdating at the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs (Sept. 6, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts090606cc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6B4T-38TQ] (explaining that before SOX, “a grant in January might not 
have to be disclosed until more than a year later.”). 
 165. See id. (explaining that companies “granted an ‘in-the-money’ option-that is, an 
option with an exercise price lower than that day’s market price. . . . by misrepresenting the 
date of the option grant, to make it appear that the grant was made on an earlier date when 
the market value was lower.”). 
 166. Id.
 167. Id.
 168. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(g)(1) (2012).  See also Final Rule: Ownership Reports and 
Trading By Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 
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addition, this information must be disclosed electronically, allowing 
shareholders access to the information almost instantly.169  Furthermore, the 
SEC approved changes to the New York Stock Exchange and the 
NASDAQ Stock Market listing standards, which require shareholder 
approval of nearly all equity compensation plans.170  The terms of the grant 
must be disclosed, as well as whether the option grant allows for the 
exercise price to be less than the fair market value at the time of the 
grant.171  However, the evidence in options backdating scandals also shows 
that executives ignored the timely reporting requirements because the SEC 
did not explicitly provide for penalties for late reporting.  Thus, the SOX 
requirements and the SEC Rule have been ineffective in controlling 
executives’ incentives or their opportunities to backdate their option grants. 
In December 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
issued the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 123R, 
which again attempted to eradicate the accounting advantage of stock 
options issued at-the-money.172  The Standards require that all stock options 
granted to an employee be recorded as an expense on the financial 
statements regardless of whether the exercise price is at fair market 
value.173  In 2006, the SEC began to require all public companies to also 
report information including: 
the grant date fair value under FAS 123R (which is aggregated in 
the total compensation amount that is shown for each named 
executive officer); the FAS 123 grant date; the closing market 
price on the grant date if it is greater than the exercise price of the 
option; and the date of the compensation committee or full board 
of directors took action to grant the option, if that date is different 
than the grant date.174
Companies are also required to explain the goals and policies of the 
executive compensation plans.175  Reports to investors must discuss 
whether the company has engaged in backdating or might do so in the 
34-46421, Sec. II.B (Aug. 27, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-46421.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A4HT-373U] (describing the final rule and requesting comments). 
 169. Cox, supra note 164. 
 170. Id.
 171. Id.
 172. Fin. Acct. Series: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., i, 1 (Dec. 2004), 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1218220124271&accepte
dDisclaimer=true [https://perma.cc/CZ9V-Q9BL] (establishing standards for the accounting 
of transactions in which equity instruments are exchanged).  
 173. Cox, supra note 164. 
 174. Id.
 175. Id.
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future and, if so, how.176
In addition, in 2007, the SEC enacted rules requiring full disclosure of 
all aspects of executive and director pay and benefits, including stock 
options.  These rules require the company to disclose the full amount of an 
executive’s compensation in a single number, and whether a stock option is 
backdated.177  If a stock option is backdated, the corporation must provide 
the reason why.  The goal of the rule is to make executive compensation 
more transparent to the shareholders, thereby ending the practice of 
executive backdating.  However, as we demonstrate in this paper, 
additional regulatory supervision is still needed to ensure the end of the 
backdating practice. 
Backdating gifts of stock involves many of the same economic and 
legal concerns that arise with backdating executive stock options.  
Although the link is less obvious than in the case of executive stock 
options, backdating charitable gifts also weakens the link between 
shareholder value and management incentives.  Executives who backdate 
their donations receive the benefit of a larger deduction, without providing 
any corresponding performance for their firm.  Furthermore, the treasury 
and taxpayers in general lose when donors of backdated stock underpay 
their taxes.  In order to raise a given amount of revenue, other taxpayers 
must pay higher taxes.  To the extent that executive backdating practices 
and the executive is denounced for tax fraud, the company may incur 
litigation costs and costs associated with reputational damage, which in 
turn harm the company’s investors. 
4. Using Insider Information 
The final hypothesis presented and evidenced in the data is the inside 
information hypothesis:  executives use inside information to time their 
gifts for the highest deduction.  For example, they may choose to donate 
stock just prior to a negative announcement that causes the stock prices to 
plummet.  Unlike in the case of spring-loading, the insider-executive does 
not necessarily manipulate the flow of information.  She does, however, 
time her stock donations based on material information that, at the date of 
donation, is not available to the public.  This behavior is analogous to the 
type of insider trading that is prohibited under Section 10(b) of the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act. 
As mentioned previously, insider trading cases are generally brought 
 176. Id.
 177. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 33-8732A, 34-54302A, IC-27444A, at 17-18 (Nov. 7, 2006), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W4P-QQ2S].  
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under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which prohibits “any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” used “in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security,” and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder; or Section 16(b).178  Although Section 16(b) was initially 
drafted with the express purpose of targeting insider trading, today it is 
Rule 10b-5 that is more commonly used to bring insider trading cases.179
One of Congress’s primary concerns when drafting the 1934 Act was 
“to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets[.]”180  In In re Cady, 
Roberts, & Co., the administrative law court stated that Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 “are not intended as a specification of particular acts or 
practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the 
infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of 
investors and others.”181  In other words, even if nondisclosure of inside 
information does not constitute fraud, it nonetheless “may be viewed as 
a . . . practice which operate[s] as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers” in 
violation of Rule 10b-5.182  Although recent insider trading cases have not 
read Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 so broadly, the “disclose and abstain” 
principle articulated in Cady, Roberts, whereby an insider in possession of 
material nonpublic information must disclose the information before 
trading, and further addressed in Texas Gulf Sulphur, still remains.  In 
addition to encouraging “vigorous market competition,”183 the “disclose or 
abstain” rule promotes fairness to public investors.184
Using inside information to opportunistically time gifts of stock 
presents similar problems of unfairness as insider trading “in connection 
with the purchase or sale” of stock.  The ability to maximize the value of a 
tax deduction on the basis of inside information places insider-executives at 
an unfair advantage relative to other taxpayers.  Moreover, like many tax 
loopholes, this advantage is available primarily to those in high income tax 
brackets, creating skewed distributional effects favoring high-income 
individuals.185  Other taxpayers are indirectly harmed by strategic timing of 
stock gifts as they bear the brunt of decreased funding for government-
 178. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 179. See Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1, 56-57 (1980) (“The conventional wisdom is that Congress . . . expressed its concern 
with insiders’ informational advantage by enacting section 16.”). 
 180. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012). 
 181. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). 
 182. Id. at 913. 
 183. Jennifer D. Antolini et al., Securities Fraud, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 983, 984 (1997). 
 184. Micah A. Acoba, Insider Trading Jurisprudence After United States v. O’Hagan: A 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 551(2) Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1356, 1365 (1999). 
 185. Furthermore, “CEOs who make major stock gifts to family foundations tend to be 
older and considerably richer than the general population of CEOs.” Yermack, supra note 1, 
at 116. 
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funded public facilities and services and higher tax rates than if the 
charitable contributions had not been opportunistically timed.186  Further, to 
the extent that executives often time stock donations just before a decrease 
in the underlying stock price, the use of inside information to time stock 
gifts is dishonest to the charities that receive the contributions and believe 
that they are receiving something of greater value.  Such behavior, if made 
public, may lead to further erosion of investor confidence. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Taxpayers are hurt by opportunistic stock gifting by insiders.187  Yet, 
some argue that there is no easy solution.  Executives often donate to take 
advantage of the tax subsidies, and if there were stricter rules and harsher 
insider trading liability, perhaps insiders would not donate stock as 
frequently.  Many studies conclude that donations increase substantially as 
the availability of tax deductions increase.188  The government, however, 
also has an interest in ensuring that gift tax exemptions are appropriately 
applied for those donations that will serve the public good.  Further, the 
government has an interest in upholding the integrity of the securities 
markets. 
We thus propose four regulatory reforms to address these issues.  
First, we propose that the delayed-reporting exemption given to the gifts 
should be eliminated.  Under current law, gifts can be reported up to forty-
five days after the end of the fiscal year.  Our research finds that executives 
are exploiting this exemption to backdate their gifts.  We propose that the 
reporting requirements for gifts be similar to any other insider transactions, 
namely within two business days of the gift transaction.  Second, we 
propose increased penalties for late reporting of gift transactions.  These 
penalties should be stated as a percentage of the amount of the gift and 
should increase with the number of days gifts are reported late.  Third, if 
any gift transactions are reported late, we propose that the executives be 
required to explain the circumstances that led to the late reporting and 
certify that the gift was not backdated. 
Because insiders have an incentive to use inside information and use a 
variety of manipulative games to time their gifts, spring-loading or bullet-
dodging must also be controlled.  To address these issues, we suggest an 
ex-post settlement device.  Following the lead of the Private Securities 
 186. Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25, 41 (1999). 
 187. Yermack, supra note 1, at 122. 
 188. See id. (“These studies generally conclude that donations to charity rise when the 
availability of valuable tax deductions increases, especially for wealthy taxpayers.”).
2016] MANIPULATIVE GAMES OF GIFTS 1173 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, we suggest that a look-back provision be 
implemented for tax deductions for insider gifts of stock.189  If the stock 
price drops over the 90 days following the date of gift-giving, then the 
average share price during the 90-day period following the gift should be 
used for the purpose of the corresponding tax deduction, instead of the 
price at the date of the gift.  This provision will help de-incentivize both 
inside information-motivated donations as well as spring-loading and 
bullet-dodging.  Executives would have little or no incentive to manipulate 
information flow in the immediate short-term to increase the tax deduction 
because the deduction allowed would be a value averaged over a 90-day 
period. 
CONCLUSION
This paper explores five non-mutually exclusive hypotheses regarding 
how executives time the donations of  their own firms’ stock: 1) wait until 
after the stock has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well 
as their tax deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the good news prior to 
the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions (spring-
loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock 
to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging); 
4)  backdate the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax 
deductions (backdating); and 5) use material, undisclosed inside 
information about the future prospects of their firm’s stock to maximize 
their donation and tax deductions (inside information).  The first timing 
behavior involves no illicit behavior.  However, as discussed above, there 
are serious legal and policy issues raised by the other four behaviors. 
Overall, we find that gifts are well-timed.  Using a comprehensive 
database of over 200,000 gifts during 1986-2014, our research 
demonstrates that each of the five hypotheses, including the backdating 
hypothesis explain at least some of the timing behavior of gift-giving in the 
United States.  Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year 
 189. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).  The Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA) was enacted in response to concerns that large damage awards potentially 
available in securities fraud class action lawsuits were encouraging the proliferation of 
frivolous suits.  See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Legislators 
were apparently motivated in large part by a perceived need to deter strike suits wherein 
opportunistic private plaintiffs file securities fraud claims of dubious merit in order to exact 
large settlement recoveries.”).  The PSLRA addresses this in part by a 90-day “look back 
provision,” which reduces a plaintiff’s recovery to the difference between the purchase price 
and mean price of the security at issue during the 90-day period after corrective disclosure.  
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2012). 
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before the gift date and they fall abnormally by about 5% during the one 
year after the gift date.  We find that this inverse-V shape pattern is 
stronger for late-reported gifts, which is consistent with the back-dating 
hypothesis.  We also find that reporting of almost two-thirds of gifts is 
delayed, thus exploiting an exemption given to them under SOX, further 
contributing to the regulatory conditions that make it easier to manipulate 
the timing of gifts. 
Due to the differing behaviors that may be in play when gifts are well-
timed and the difficulty in determining whether the motive is legitimate, we 
propose relatively simple regulatory reforms to curb incentives for illicit 
timing.  Our policy recommendations should improve the compliance of 
gifts with anti-fraud provisions and decrease tax fraud by eliminating the 
exemption for late-reporting and imposing a penalty, as well as support the 
general anti-fraud provisions of securities laws by imposing a 90-day look-
back period for determining the stock value for purposes of the tax 
deduction.  Furthermore, these proposals should strike a balance among 
competing policy considerations by continuing to provide incentives for 
insider charitable donations of stock while at the same time reducing tax 
and securities fraud. 
Finally, in light of our data showing that stock returns following gifts 
of insider stock are negative, a charity receiving shares of an executive’s 
own firm’s stock as a donation might be well be advised to sell the stock 
immediately, provided that the charity is not subject to Section 16(b).  It is 
probably also a good idea to institutionalize this rule for all stock donations 
in order combat any resistance from the donors. 
